Contracted Employment at County Recycling Facility Constitutes Public Works for Prevailing Wage Purposes

The California Supreme Court holds that contracted employment at county recycling facilities constitutes "public works" for purposes of the prevailing wage law.

 Staffing and management services agency Barrett Business Services, Inc. provided employees for two publicly owned and operated recycling facilities, under contracts with Los Angeles County Sanitation Districts. Employees David Kaanaana and others sued Barrett, alleging, among other things, that it failed to pay them the prevailing wage applicable to workers employed on public works.

The trial court granted Barrett's motion to strike the prevailing wage claim, finding the work plaintiffs performed sorting recyclables did not come within the definition of "public works."

The court of appeal reversed the trial court's ruling on the motion to strike, holding that the trial court erred in finding plaintiffs were not entitled to the prevailing wage for their work at the recycling facilities.

The California Supreme Court affirmed, holding that plaintiffs' work fell within the definition of public works set forth in Labor Code §1720(a)(2). Section 1720(a) defines public work as including "work done for irrigation, utility, reclamation, and improvement districts, and other districts of this type." Because the work at issue was performed for a sanitation district, it fell squarely within this definition.

Barrett nonetheless argued that the work at issue here also needed to comply with §1720(a)(1), which applies to "construction, alteration, demolition, installation, or repair" work. Not so, the court found. Unlike §1720(a)(1), §1720(a)(2) defines public work not in terms of the tasks performed, but in terms of the governmental district for which the work is done. It does not set out an assortment of activities as the construction and installation provision does. Instead, it simply refers to "work." Standing on its own, this generic term may embrace myriad endeavors. However, words used in a statute are considered in context, not isolation. Here, it appeared the Legislature intended §1720(a)(2) to include a wider array of tasks than construction-type labor. Other provisions in §1720(a) contain limiting language when defining street and sewer work, carpet laying, demolition and infrastructure projects, and tree removal as public work. Section 1720(a)(2) does not. It speaks only of "work." This lack of any limiting language is significant. Moreover, the legislative history of the statute and surrounding provisions indicate that the language used by the Legislature reflected an informed choice. The restriction proposed by Barrett thus did not apply. Justice Kruger, joined by Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justice Jenkins, concurred, writing separately to note the seeming incongruity in the statute's treatment of utility and other covered districts, when compared to other public agencies, and to suggest that it may be time for the Legislature to revisit §1720(a)(2). 

Kaanaana v. Barrett Business Services, Inc. 

March 29 2021.