No Due Process Claim Based Upon Unsupervised School Rest Room Misconduct

In Patel v. Kent School District, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a judgment of the district court, holding that a mother did not have a constitutional due-process claim on behalf of her developmentally disabled daughter against a teacher for alleged failure to properly supervise her daughter, who had several sexual encounters with another student in a school restroom. 

A.H. was a developmentally disabled freshman student at Kentridge High School (KHS) in the Kent School District. Pursuant to her individualized education plan (IEP), A.H. was in special-education teacher Francine Wilhelm’s classroom. The IEP continued for the remainder of A.H.’s freshman year. In response to concern expressed by Madhuri Patel, A.H.’s mother, early in A.H.’s sophomore year, KHS held a meeting that Wilhelm attended. 

At that meeting, KHS officials were informed by Kent Youth and Family Services, a state corporation and healthcare provider, that A.H.’s safety might be compromised were she left unsupervised, including while at lunch and especially while in the restroom. After the meeting, KHS agreed in writing to resume A.H.’s IEP, which provided for A.H.’s constant supervision. 

But Wilhelm subsequently permitted A.H., aged sixteen, to use a restroom adjacent to Wilhelm’s classroom without supervision in order to foster her development. At least five times during such unsupervised trips to the restroom, A.H. had sex with a boy named Matt, who was another developmentally disabled student in Wilhelm’s class. 

Patel sued the school district and Wilhelm in state court on claims that included negligence and failure to protect. Patel also sued Wilhelm only on a federal claim under 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging without elaboration that Wilhelm violated A.H.’s Fourteenth-Amendment rights. Based on that, the case was removed to district court, where Wilhelm moved for partial summary judgment of the §1983 claim. Wilhelm argued that Patel’s complaint did not explain how Wilhelm had violated A.H.’s rights. 

Patel responded that Wilhelm violated A.H.’s due process right to bodily integrity by failing to supervise her trips to the next-door restroom, thus causing her to be “repeatedly raped.” The district court granted Wilhelm’s motion and dismissed the §1983 claim, finding as a matter of law that Wilhelm had not deprived A.H. of any federally protected right. The district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Patel’s remaining state-law claims and dismissed them without prejudice. Patel appealed. 

The court of appeals affirmed, holding that Patel did not have a constitutional due-process claim against Wilhelm on behalf of A.H.

The court found that partial summary judgment was correctly granted to Wilhelm. It was undisputed that Wilhelm was acting under the color of state law. The sole issue was whether Wilhelm deprived A.H. of any federally protected right. As a corollary to the general rule that a state is not liable for its omissions, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment typically does not impose a duty on a state to protect individuals from third parties. 

Exceptions to that rule apply when a special relationship exists between the plaintiff and the state and when the state affirmatively places the plaintiff in danger by acting with deliberate indifference to a known obvious danger. Patel could establish a due process violation only if one of those exceptions applied because her §1983 claim was based on the alleged omission of Wilhelm by failing to properly supervise A.H. Patel did not do so. 

The special-relationship exception does not apply when a state fails to protect a person who is not in custody. Patel argued that A.H. was in state custody while she was at school, given that the state statutorily mandated compulsory school attendance and that KHS had a duty to protect A.H. during school hours under the state in-loco-parentis doctrine, which requires schools to protect pupils from dangers that can reasonably be anticipated. However, the court found, compulsory school attendance and in-loco-parentis status do not create custody under the strict standard of DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989). 

The state-created-danger exception applies only where there is affirmative conduct by the state that places the plaintiff in danger and where the state acts with deliberate indifference to a known or obvious danger. Here, Patel failed to show that Wilhelm acted with deliberate indifference in neglecting to properly supervise A.H. 

Wilhelm did not act in a manner contrary to assisting someone in a known, immediate danger. This would be a different case if Wilhelm knew that A.H. was about to enter the restroom with Matt or otherwise be alone with him, yet then stood idly by. Rather, Wilhelm monitored the developing situation between the two students and once even rushed out of her classroom to prevent a possible incident between them. 

Further, Wilhelm did not know about any immediate risk, despite her promising to supervise A.H. at all times and then allegedly failing to do that. Wilhelm knew only that A.H. required extensive supervision and had been involved in past restroom incidents, the details of which she did not know. Wilhelm did not know there was any immediate danger in allowing A.H. to briefly use the next-door restroom alone. 

Case law makes clear that mere negligence or even gross negligence is not enough for deliberate indifference. Here, there was no evidence that Wilhelm intended to expose A.H. to a risk or otherwise knew that something was going to happen but ignored the risk. 

Rather, Wilhelm was fairly active in protecting A.H. She regularly communicated about A.H. with school officials, other teachers, and Patel. Wilhelm asked another teacher to help her monitor the possible developing relationship between A.H. and Matt. She spoke separately with both students about their hugging in the hall.

Comments

[Marla Ahlgrimm]

I hope that justice is imminent.